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Abstract
In Scotland, the age of  criminal responsibility is 8, although children cannot be prosecuted until they are
12. In England and Wales, for all purposes, the age is 10. This article argues that a further mechanism is
needed to protect the young who do wrong within the criminal process and it argues for a new, bespoke defence,
to be available to young people from the age of  criminal responsibility until they attain the age of  18. It
looks firstly at criminal capacity – what it is that needs to be understood fairly to hold anyone criminally
responsible – and draws on material from developmental psychology and neuro-science, as well as looking at
the child’s lived experience, to provide some evidence that the young may, without fault, lack this capacity. It
then examines the use of  age generally in law, and the age of  criminal responsibility within this. Next, it
considers existing lack of  capacity defences – nonage, diminished responsibility, insanity (or mental disorder)
and absence of  mens rea – to consider their suitability for use by young and immature defendants. Finally,
it presents a proposal for the form of  the new defence, taking into account the need for balance with the public
interest in conviction of  the guilty. Throughout, it notes and analyses the Law Commission’s proposals in
this respect.
Keywords: age of  criminal responsibility; defence; criminal law; young offenders; youth
justice; juvenile justice; criminal capacity; developmental immaturity.
1 Introduction
Throughout history, the criminal law has made concessions to children. It is reportedthat, in 924 AD, King Aethelstan allowed them a defence to charges of  capital theft
unless they had resisted or fled.1 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Blackstone,2 in
relation to English law, and Hume,3 in Scotland, were concerned that capital punishment
should not be inflicted on those who, by virtue of  being young, could not understand fully
what they had done. Today, these practices have crystallised, in both jurisdictions, into the
provision of  a minimum age of  criminal responsibility (MACR) below which children are
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1     See Wiley B Sanders (ed), Juvenile Offenders for a Thousand Years (University of  North Carolina Press 1970) 3–4.
2     Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of  England Book 4 (1765) (Cavendish 2001) ch 2.
3     Baron D Hume, Commentaries on the Law of  Scotland Respecting Crimes (1844) (Law Society of  Scotland 1989) 
30–37.
deemed incapable of  criminal guilt4 but, beyond that, the criminal law makes no further
special provision. In Scotland the MACR is 8,5 but children cannot be prosecuted until they
are 126 (though the Scottish government is consulting on raising the MACR to 12).7 In
England and Wales the age is 10 for all purposes.8 This paper argues that a further
mechanism is needed to protect the young within the criminal process. In this respect, it
enters the debate9 generated by the Law Commission, initially in its report on Murder,
Manslaughter and Infanticide10 and latterly, more generally, in its discussion paper on Criminal
Liability: Insanity and Automatism,11 and argues for the provision of  a bespoke defence of
‘developmental immaturity’. This would be available to be pled by young defendants, in
appropriate circumstances, at any time from the MACR until they attain the age of  18.
The criminal process brings children accused of  crime under the aegis of  its balancing
role between their own right to a fair trial, now enshrined in Article 6 of  the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the public interest in conviction of  those
who have committed criminal offences. Crimes committed by the young are inherently
newsworthy as can be illustrated by the recent case of  the murder, on 8 December 2014,
in Hartlepool of  a 39-year old woman, Angela Wrightson by two girls then aged 13 and
14.12 The case was extensively covered by nine national newspapers,13 BBC News and Sky
News as well as by social media. Where a crime is serious, the facts are widely publicised
and there is little or no doubt that the correct perpetrator has been identified, lack of
capacity defences may encounter public opposition.14 The article considers this issue in
the context of  the over-arching need for fairness to all.
The article argues that a defence is indicated because children’s understanding of
criminal behaviour may be limited in comparison with (or different from) that of  their
adult counterparts15 and/or children may be unable, or impaired in their ability, to
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4     Children are also referred to different systems than adults in relation to some offending behaviour –
i.e. children’s hearings in Scotland; youth courts in England, though some continue to be prosecuted in the
‘adult’ court (Crown Court in England and Wales; Sheriff  or High Court in Scotland).
5     Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s 41.
6     Ibid s 41A.
7     See <https://consult.scotland.gov.uk/youth-justice/minimum-age-of-criminal-responsibility>. In England
and Wales, Lord Dholakia’s Bill to raise the age to 12 had a second reading, but was not allocated for its
committee stage and cannot progress. See <http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2015–16/
ageofcriminalresponsibility.html>.
8     Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 50, as amended by Children and Young Persons Act 1963, s 16(1).
9     See also Catherine Elliott, ‘Criminal Responsibility and Children: A New Defence Required to Acknowledge
the Absence of  Capacity and Choice’ (2011) 75 Journal of  Criminal Law 289; Enys Delmage, ‘The Minimum
Age of  Criminal Responsibility: A Medico-Legal Perspective’ (2013) 13 Youth Justice 102.
10   Law Com No 304 (TSO 2006), paras 5.125–37 (in relation only to the defence of  diminished responsibility).
11   Law Commission (2013) ch 9.
12   Andrew Norfolk, ‘Killer Girls Stifled Yawns as They Were Jailed for 15 years’ The Times (London 8 April
2016) 16.
13   Star, Mirror, Telegraph, Express, i, Independent, Sun, Times, and Guardian. For illustrative purposes, a search on the
Nexis database of  newspaper articles for ‘Angela Wrightson’ returned 397 hits in national British newspapers, 
14   See, for example, Ralph Slovenko, ‘The Insanity Defense in the Wake of  the Hinckley Trial’ (1983) 14 Rutgers
Law Journal 373.
15   See Elizabeth S Scott and Laurence Steinberg, Rethinking Juvenile Justice (Harvard University Press 2008) 37–38;
also Daniel P Keating, ‘Adolescent Thinking’ in S Shirley Feldman and Glen R Elliott (eds), At the Threshold:
The Developing Adolescent (Harvard University Press 1990) 54–89, particularly on the shift between children’s and
adolescent thought.
exercise rational control over their behaviour.16 A defence would make it easier to ensure
that, where it is relevant, evidence supporting a claim of  lack of  capacity, arising as a
result of  developmental immaturity, is available to the court. These issues also partly
constitute the basis of  children’s vulnerability as defendants which is assumed
throughout.17
In part 2, the article considers the meaning of  criminal capacity – or what it is that
needs to be understood in order to be held criminally responsible. It draws on material
from developmental psychology and neuro-science, as well as the significance of  the
child’s life experiences, in identifying reasons why children may lack the necessary
understanding and abilities. In part 3, it considers the current use of  age in law generally
and the role of  the MACR in particular, seeking to show that, while the law finds the kind
of  bright line which chronological age draws easy to manage, these lines are somewhat
arbitrary. A defence which would apply across an age range would therefore have
advantages. Part 4 considers the existing provision made by the law to accommodate
claims of  lack of  capacity and their shortcomings if  pled on behalf  of  children. Finally,
part 5 turns its attention to the possible form of  a defence and its operation within the
criminal process.
‘Children’ are defined, in line with the definition in Article 1 of  the UN Convention on
the Rights of  the Child (1989) (UNCRC) as ‘every human being below the age of  eighteen
years’.18 While the paper draws primarily on Scots law to exemplify points, a defence of
developmental immaturity is proposed for both Scotland and England and Wales.
2 Why should children have a defence? A deficit in criminal capacity
In order to be found guilty of  (most) criminal offences, the accused person must have
carried out the proscribed behaviour (the actus reus) with the accompanying mental
attitude specified in the crime’s definition (the mens rea) and s/he must have criminal
capacity.19 It is self-evident that very young children do, on occasion, carry out acts which
could constitute the behavioural element of  offences. For example, toddlers might draw
on walls (vandalism).20 Newspapers quite frequently report ‘offences’ by so-called
‘underage’ offenders.21 As will be discussed more fully below, if  it is defined (excessively)
narrowly, some very young children might even be considered to have carried out these
acts with the requisite mens rea. The key issue, then, is criminal capacity defined, applying
H L A Hart’s classic exposition,22 as understanding of  the act in its context and its
consequences and having a fair opportunity not to carry it out. Nicola Lacey has defined
it in these terms:
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16   See Elizabeth Cauffman and Laurence Steinberg, ‘(Im)maturity of  Judgment in Adolescence: Why
Adolescents May be Less Culpable than Adults’ (2000) 18 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 741.
17   In Scotland, child witnesses are currently defined as ‘vulnerable’ (Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
s 271(1)(a).
18   ‘unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier’.
19   See, for example, Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder. Principles of  Criminal Law 7th edn (OUP 2013) para
5.1; Elliott (n 9).
20   Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995, s 52.
21   For example, ‘Kids Named in £10K Blaze’ Daily Mirror (London 10 October 2015), 33 (two children aged 6
and 9 alleged to have started a fire at a branch of  Asda in Bolton, Greater Manchester); Matthew Davis, ‘Rise
in Criminals as Young as Two’ Express Online (London July 7 2013) (2-year-old at centre of  police probe into
criminal damage in Bedfordshire, three 5-year-olds recorded as racially abusing people in Greater Manchester;
4-year-old accused of  shoplifting in West Mercia).
22   Herbert L A Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of  Law 2nd edn (OUP 2008) ch 1.
[t]his conception of  responsibility consists in both a cognitive and a volitional
element: a person must both understand the nature of  her actions, knowing the
relevant circumstances and being aware of  possible consequences, and have a
genuine opportunity to do otherwise than she does – to exercise control over her
actions, by means of  choice.23
The Law Commission takes the view that anyone who completely lacks criminal capacity
should not be found criminally responsible.24 It draws out three particular capacities
needed for the fair imposition of  criminal responsibility: ‘the ability rationally to form a
judgment, the ability to understand wrongfulness, and the ability to control one’s physical
actions’.25 Children and young people may not be able to conform to some or all of  these
requirements because of  immaturity and it is in such a situation that the proposed defence
could be pled. The next section will consider some of  the attributes of  childhood
recognised by developmental psychology, neuro-science and arising from life experience
which help to substantiate the possibility of  a lack of  capacity in (some) young people.
For more than a century,26 developmental psychology has provided an evidence base
for the observable phenomenon that children develop in a number of  respects – physical,
mental, intellectual, emotional and moral – simultaneously,27 but at different rates. Recent
advances in the field of  neuro-science, particularly in functional magnetic resonance
imaging, have ‘provided a neurological explanation for much of  the research describing
adolescents’ behavioral [sic] immaturities’.28 Thus, neuro-science might be said to offer a
‘harder’ science complement to psychological perspectives.
In terms of  intellectual development, it is widely accepted that ‘[c]hildren’s thinking is
not the same as adult thinking. As a child develops their thinking changes.’29 Thus,
[w]hen children think they are constrained by their current cognitive structure.
Some distorting of  experience is inevitable as children attempt to incorporate,
understand, or interpret this experience. A child’s mind is not like a camera;
experience is always filtered through the child’s current ways of  understanding.30
Cognition, on Jean Piaget’s theory, is a central organising concept which makes it possible
for children to ‘assimilate’ existing skills and discoveries so that they can be applied in
novel contexts and to ‘adapt’ to new experiences.31 This has been explained as the ‘“pure
sensory input” [being] “transformed” by some form of  “mental work”’.32 In
psychoanalytic theory, the ego performs much the same rationalising, controlling and
centralising function over the id (the individual’s baser instincts) and the superego, which
can be loosely described as the conscience.33 ‘[T]he central organising tendency of  ego
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23   See Nicola Lacey, State Punishment: Political Principles and Community Values (Routledge 1988) 63.
24   Law Commission (n 11) para 1.20.
25   Ibid paras 3.4, 4.4–4.54.
26   Carol Brown, Developmental Psychology (Sage 2008) 8–10.
27   See, for example, Natarjan Sukumar Gowda, Learning and the Learner: Insights into the Processes of  Learning and
Teaching 2nd edn (PHI Learning Private 2015) 50–52.
28   Cheryl B Preston and Brandon T Crowther, ‘Legal Osmosis: The Role of  Brain Science in Protecting
Adolescents’ (2014) 43 Hofstra Law Review 447, 460.
29   Lisa Oakley, Cognitive Development (Routledge 2004) 2.
30   Patricia H Miller, ‘Piaget’s Theory: Past, Present and Future’ in Usha Goswami (ed), The Wiley-Blackwell
Handbook of  Childhood Cognitive Development (Wiley-Blackwell 2011) 649, 653.
31   For a summary, see John H Flavell, ‘Piaget’s Legacy’ (1996) 7 Psychological Science 200.
32   Howard Leventhal and Klaus Scherer, ‘The Relationship of  Emotion to Cognition: A Functional Approach
to a Semantic Controversy’ (1987) 1 Cognition and Emotion 3, 6 (quotes in original).
33   Erik H Erikson, Childhood and Society 2nd edn (WW Norton & Co 1963) 192–94, 415.
development [has been defined] as the progressive differentiation between “subject” and
“object” – the aspects of  self  one controls and those one is controlled by.’34 The key
point is that to be criminally responsible, with its requirement to exercise rational control
over action, these central organising concepts must be well developed. Erik Erikson
identifies the period between the ages of  12 and 18 as one of  frenetic ego activity;35
Piaget has been regarded as considering that intellectual development (which includes the
development of  cognition) is still ongoing until around 15.36 Psychological development
thus seems to be a continuing – even intensive – process well into adolescence.
Neuro-science also offers arguments in favour of  giving some leeway to young people
at the outer limits of  childhood and even beyond. These arguments rest particularly on
three areas of  observed development in the brain, which is itself  possible through
progress in brain scan technology37 in recent years, allowing ‘unique access to visualizing
the brain in transition’.38 There is agreement in both medical literature and legal academic
discourse which relies upon it that the development of  the amygdala, growing and
pruning of  white and grey matter and frontal lobe (prefrontal cortex) development are all
of  relevance.39 In essence, the amygdala, is more developed in adolescents than the
prefrontal cortex. This means that their decision-making tends to be more instinctive and
directed by emotion (these being amygdale properties) than rational and considered (these
belonging to the prefrontal cortex).40 The ratios of  white and grey matter relate to the
speed and efficiency of  message-carrying pathways in the brain. Until the white matter
(myelin) is properly distributed, transmission of  signals within the brain can, on occasion,
be erratic.41 All of  this is of  importance because it provides a basis from which to argue
that even young people whose development is advanced in areas such as intellect and
morality may still have difficulty exercising rational control over reckless impulses.
Finally, in considering why children should have a defence, it is necessary to look at
their lived experience. The criminal law rests on a notion of  free will42 – that it is
appropriate for the state to impose punishment because the wrong-doer exercised a
choice to commit an act known to be wrongful in a situation where s/he could equally
have refrained from so doing. Children’s ability to choose in this way may be more
constrained by, for example, lifestyle choices made by their parents, the culture in which
they live and a lack of  experience of  positive alternatives. This is well explained by Elliott:
. . . research has shown such a close co-relation between negative elements of
the external environment in which a child is living and criminal conduct that it
is clear that it is these external factors that have been determinative of  the child’s
criminal conduct rather than the child acting as an autonomous individual
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34   P Michiel Westenberg, Augusto Blasi and Lawrence D Cohn, ‘Introduction: Contributions and Controversies’
in P Michiel Westenberg, Augusto Blasi and Lawrence D Cohn (eds), Personality Development: Theoretical,
Empirical and Clinical Investigations of  Loevinger’s Conception of  Ego Development (Lawrence Ehrlbaum Associates
1998) 1, 3.
35   Erikson (n 33) 261–63.
36   See Larry Cunningham, ‘A Question of  Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Consistent Vision of
Children and their Status under Law’ (2006) 10 UC Davis Journal of  Juvenile Law and Policy 275, 282.
37   Preston and Crowther (n 28) 458.
38   Megan Moreno and Meaghan E Trainor, ‘Adolescence Extended: Implications of  New Brain Research on
Medicine and Policy’ (2013) 102 Acta Paediatrica 226, 227.
39   Ibid, 227.
40   See Charlotte Walsh, ‘Youth Justice and Neuroscience: A Dual-Use Dilemma’ (2011) 51 British Journal of
Criminology 21, 23.
41   Preston and Crowther (n 28) 458.
42   Ashworth and Horder (n 19), para 2.1, which also discusses theoretical challenges to this ‘choice theory’. 
exercising a choice. Perhaps focusing on issues of  morality and ignoring
personal responsibility was historically understandable, but as social research
techniques have become more advanced and the resulting statistical evidence
has become clearer regarding the impact of  such issues as poor parenting and
poverty on a child’s criminal behaviour, it is now blatantly unjust simply to
ignore the social reality.43
An example is found in a case study on restorative justice. The mother of  a victim
attending a restorative conference gave her impression of  the young offender:
I didn’t think he could see where the harm was in all he’d done. I asked him why
he went into the hall and he said: ‘I was looking for something to steal’. He said
it so openly like it was, ‘What else would I be doing?’
It turned out he was the oldest of  six children and the mother just sent him out
to steal and that was his way of  being brought up.44
From an economic perspective, Jens Qvortrup has commented that ‘children are
accounted for in terms of  their parents’ economic situation, and they are thus split up in
accordance with criteria that do not characterize their own life conditions’.45
The key point is that children’s ability to make lifestyle choices and their
understanding of  the moral norms of  the culture in which they grow up will be heavily
constrained by those of  their parents and, indeed, their peers46 to an extent which is
much greater than for adults. This affects the argument that all crime is committed with
free will and through the exercise of  informed choice. The Law Commission has also
recognised all of  these issues: ‘a defendant may wish to rely on either biological factors
or social or environmental influences, or all of  these to support a claim of  developmental
immaturity’.47
The material from developmental psychology, in particular, additionally suggests that,
currently, the MACR is set at a point where a significant proportion of  those deemed to have
criminal responsibility may, in fact be relatively immature intellectually, emotionally and
morally. The neuro-science leads to a similar conclusion about mental development.
Setting the MACR requires a clear policy choice as to whether to use a young age so that
the likelihood of  failing to impose criminal responsibility on precocious children of  early
maturity is diminished or setting it further through the lifespan so that a higher proportion
of  those deemed criminally responsible will be sufficiently mature developmentally to have
criminal capacity in fact. The choice currently taken is the former and this is highlighted
through part 3’s analysis of  the way in which the law uses age generally.
3 The use of age in law generally and the deployment of the MACR
Chronological age is used in law to draw bright lines so that the issue of  whether an
individual has acquired a particular age-defined right or taken on such a responsibility can
be formulated as a clear unambiguous yes/no binary.48 Such line-drawing offers certainty
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 67(3)332
43   Elliott (n 9) 300.
44   Time for a Fresh Start: Report of  the Independent Commission on Youth Crime and Antisocial Behaviour (Police
Foundation 2010) 63.
45   Jens Qvortrup, ‘Childhood Matters: An Introduction’ in Jens Qvortrup, Marjatta Bardy, Giovanni Sgritta and
Helmut Wintersberger (eds), Childhood Matters: Social Theory, Practice and Politics (Avebury 1994) 1, 16.
46   Preston and Crowther (n 28) 454, 456.
47   Law Commission (n 11) para 9.12.
48   See, also, Kathryn Hollingsworth, ‘Responsibility and Rights: Children and their Parents in the Youth Justice
System’ (2007) 21 International Journal of  Law, Policy and the Family 190, 196–97.
but, in view of  the individualised way in which children develop, the lines drawn are
bound to be somewhat arbitrary. For example, body piercing is legal at 16;49 tattoos not
until 18.50 Young people can join the army51 and get married52 at 16. The UK
parliamentary election voting age is 18,53 but in Scotland (for elections relating to
Scotland) it has been lowered to 16.54 Films are certificated for viewing at various points
throughout childhood. In 2009, the Scottish government published a leaflet for children
entitled What Can I Do at My Age?.55 Its only entry under the age of  8 is ‘be held
responsible for crimes’.56 There are no entries at all for ages 9, 10 and 11. At 12,
according to the leaflet,57 children can, inter alia, register as an organ donor without
parental consent58 and be the subject of  an anti-social behaviour order.59 Tellingly, jury
membership is only possible at 18.60
Legally imposed and conferred responsibilities and rights for children, then, arrive
with them in an unsystematic fashion throughout the period of  childhood. As Jonathan
Todres has commented: ‘. . . the law’s approach to . . . the concept of  maturity [has been
to consider it] in a piecemeal and issue-specific fashion. The result is a legal construct of
maturity that is anything but consistent or coherent.’61While a defence would also use age
to determine the limits of  the period of  the lifespan during which it could be pled, it
would be available across a range of  ages thereby making better provision for the
individual nature of  children’s development.
The way in which the MACR currently fits into the matrix of  chronological ages in
law is also of  relevance in the argument for a defence. It is an outlier, conferred without
most of  the other rights which maturity otherwise brings (for example, to vote;62 to
marry; to have sex; to work; to adorn the body permanently).63 The Commentary to the
Beijing Rules64 suggests that the MACR should be better aligned: ‘In general, there is a
close relationship between the notion of  responsibility for delinquent or criminal
behaviour and other social rights and responsibilities (such as marital status, civil majority,
etc.).’65 By allocating only the responsibility for wrong-doing at this early stage, the law
misses the opportunity to facilitate more rounded development through the acquisition
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49   Without parental consent in terms of  licences issued to premises under the Civic Government (Scotland) Act
1982, Parts I and II.
50   Tattooing of  Minors Act 1969, s 1 (the offence is committed by the tattooist).
51   Armed Forces (Enlistment) Regulations 2009/2057, reg 4.
52   Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, s 1(1).
53   Representation of  the People Act 1983, s 1(1)(d).
54   Ibid s 2(1)(d) and (1A).
55   Cl@n Childlaw, What Can I Do At My Age? (Scottish Government 2009) <http://www.gov.scot/
Resource/Doc/268906/0079936.pdf>. 
56   Ibid 05.
57   Ibid 06–07.
58   Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006, s 8.
59   Antisocial Behaviour etc (Scotland) Act 2004, s 4(2)(a).
60   Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1980, s 1(1)(b).
61   Jonathan Todres, ‘Maturity’ (2011–2012) 48 Houston Law Review 1107, 1107.
62   Another way of  bringing the ages of  significant rights acquisition into better mutual alignment would be to
lower the voting age. See discussion in Aoife Nolan, ‘The Child as “Democratic Citizen”: Challenging the
“Participation Gap”’ (2010) Public Law 767, 777–78.
63   For discussion of  certain markers of  adulthood, particularly in the US, see Todres (n 61).
64   UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of  Juvenile Justice (1985).
65   Ibid Commentary on rule 4. Note that civil majority is not conferred until 18: Age of  Majority (Scotland) Act
1969, s 1.
and refining of  rights and responsibilities together, which would be more likely to happen
naturally if  the MACR was higher.66 The current arrangement would, however, matter
less if, on attainment of  the MACR, a defence was available, since it could operate to
bridge the gap between the acquisition of  criminal responsibility and other attributes of
adulthood.
In certain respects, the criminal law’s proscriptions serve a directive function in telling
citizens what to do.67 For example, the fact that possession of  controlled substances is a
crime68 is an indication to individuals not to take possession of  prohibited drugs. The MACR
makes a similarly definite provision of  the point in the lifespan at which a child will become
criminally responsible, but it cannot order, in the same way, that s/he simultaneously acquires
the abilities, understandings, emotional responses and moral decision-making capability
which ought to underpin this.69 This remains a matter of  individual development. In some
cases then, it imposes on a child a responsibility which, due to developmental immaturity, it
is, factually, impossible for him/her to shoulder. The provision of  a defence immediately
after the MACR would also help to address this concern.
4 Existing lack of capacity defences
Despite these perceived shortcomings, the provision of  a MACR is considered to be
necessary and important because, without one, children of  all ages, even the very
youngest, become potentially liable to prosecution for their criminal acts.70 The MACR is
also significant as the only defence available specifically to children. As well as the
protection provided by the MACR, this part will discuss other, generalised, lack of
capacity defences (diminished responsibility; insanity or mental disorder; and absence of
mens rea) to gauge their suitability to be pled by children.
The MACR provision is framed around the young child’s deemed inability, through
lack of  criminal capacity,71 to be guilty of  crime. The statutory wording is identical in
both Scotland and England and Wales: ‘[i]t shall be conclusively presumed that no child
under the age of  eight/ten years can be guilty of  any offence’.72 This is a conclusive
presumption. There is no test or discretion. Thus, in England and Wales, a child aged 9
and 364 days has no criminal responsibility. On his/her 10th birthday s/he acquires the
same responsibility (albeit with different sanctions) as an adult.73
Any young child charged with an offence would plead ‘nonage’74 – i.e. that s/he is
below the MACR. This is a complete defence resulting in automatic acquittal or it could
be pled definitively in bar of  trial.75While this may sound promising, in a country like the
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66   On this point about the need for responsibility to go hand-in-hand with rights. See Hollingsworth (n 48) and
Nolan (n 62) 773–74.
67   See Winnie Chan and Andrew P Simester, ‘Four Functions of  Mens Rea’ (2011) 70 Cambridge Law Journal
381, especially 388–93.
68   Misuse of  Drugs Act 1971, s 5(1).
69   On a similar point, see Hollingsworth (n 48) 195.
70   See Elaine E Sutherland, ‘The Age of  Reason or the Reasons for an Age? The Age of  Criminal Responsibility’
(2002) Scots Law Times 1, 4–5.
71   See Merrin v S 1987 SLT 193.
72   Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s 41/Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 50, as amended by
Children and Young Persons Act 1963, s 16(1).
73   See Heather Keating, ‘The “Responsibility” of  Children in the Criminal Law’ (2007) 19 Child and Family Law
Quarterly 183, 191.
74   See Hume (n 3) 30; Blackstone (n 2) 22.
75   See James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick, Criminal Defences and Pleas in Bar of  Trial (W Green 2006) paras 1.01
and 2.17.
UK where birth registration has been in existence since the nineteenth century,76 it is
likely that few children ever have the opportunity to use the plea since the issue of  age
can be easily established.
Beyond nonage, the criminal law offers slim pickings to anyone, of  any age, who seeks
to plead that his/her understanding or appreciation of  the criminal act is different, or
impaired, by comparison with the (adult) norm or that his/her mental state rendered it
impossible for him/her to avoid committing the offence. Perhaps the best option for the
young would be diminished responsibility77 because it recognises a deficit – or even
merely a difference from the ‘norm’ – in mental functioning which is not total. It also
allows some responsibility to be taken for the offence. It can, however, only be pled to a
charge of  murder as a partial defence so that, if  successful, the defendant would be
convicted on the reduced charge of  manslaughter or culpable homicide. In its Scottish
formulation, it applies where ‘the [accused’s] ability to determine or control conduct’ was
‘substantially impaired by reason of  abnormality of  mind’.78 The English defence rests
on ‘an abnormality of  mental functioning which – (a) arose from a recognised medical
condition’.79 Lack of  neurological, and/or psychological development in a child is not
usually abnormal and to have to claim that it is, for the purposes simply of  being able to
use the defence in the first place, might be stigmatising.80 Also, the criminal law can only
easily accommodate the operation of  diminished responsibility to ‘reduce’ the crime in
relation to murder where a lesser charge on the same facts can readily be substituted.
What is it to do where, say, the conviction is for theft? A person of  lesser capacity could
receive a lesser sentence but s/he is still criminally responsible for the ‘full’ crime of  theft.
Outwith the context of  homicide, the criminal law is ill-equipped to respond to partial
criminal capacity at the initial stage of  determining guilt.
Where the defendant suffers a more complete form of  mental disorder, resulting in
an overarching inability to understand his/her criminal act, then s/he can plead insanity81
(in England and Wales) or mental disorder82 (in Scotland). Each requires something
‘wrong’ with the accused person’s mind. In Scotland the defence is pled where ‘the person
was at the time of  the conduct unable by reason of  mental disorder to appreciate the nature
or wrongfulness of  the conduct’;83 in England the defence is available where ‘the party
accused was labouring under such a defect of  reason, from disease of  the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of  the act he was doing; or, if  he did know it, that he did not
know he was doing what was wrong’.84
A child-defendant could, similarly to an adult and regardless of  his/her age, suffer
from a form of  mental illness or disorder which would trigger this defence. If  not,
however, then the defence has some of  the shortcomings attributed above to diminished
responsibility, particularly stigma, but does not readily accommodate a lack of  developed
understanding or impulse control which could be ‘normal’ in young people. Though it
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may be that children could plead this defence – in England and Wales it has been regarded
as at least potentially available to those in a temporary hypoglycaemic state caused by
diabetes,85 that is to someone suffering from an illness usually categorised as physical
rather than mental – the grounds on which a child would be likely to offer it are different
from the severe forms of  abnormal mental state which it is designed to cover. It is not a
good fit,86 which suggests that something more tailored is needed for children.
Perhaps the most promising existing mechanism is a plea of  absence of  mens rea.87
However, this immediately raises a question of  definition, given that it has been suggested
that ‘[t]he term “mens rea” is rivalled only by the term “jurisdiction” for the varieties of
senses in which it has been used and for the quantity of  obfuscation it has created’.88 It
is axiomatic that criminal offences have both a physical element or actus reus – the
proscribed act, state of  affairs or omission – and a mental element.89 On one definition,
the latter could incorporate all aspects of  the criminal charge which relate to the
defendant’s mental state which would encompass both his/her attitude to the criminal act
and his/her criminal capacity. Alternatively, it could be defined narrowly to represent only
the specific mental attitude comprised in the crime’s definition which has a direct
relationship with the defined actus reus.90 In this second sense, then, the mens rea of  theft
in English law is, in summary, the intention permanently to deprive the owner of  the item
taken.91 Even a toddler might be able to take a thing (a toy belonging to another say) and
mean to keep it, thus satisfying the mens rea if  it is defined as the thinnest possible concept.
If, however, the mental element is taken to include broader issues of  understanding and,
indeed, development, then the mens rea is more likely to be deemed absent. This might
involve matters such as the ability to exercise rational control over the act and the
understanding of  the legal concepts of  appropriation and permanent deprivation. For an
‘absence of  mens rea’ argument to operate to protect children, it would have to examine
these broader understandings. It is, however, possible to establish ‘thin’ mens rea without
doing so. At the least, then, pleading absence of  mens rea may have uneven results
depending on the over-arching view of  the mens rea concept applied by the court.92
Other problems with relying on absence of  mens rea are that the approach would be
fruitless if  the crime charged was of  strict liability and therefore had no mens rea. Also,
there are occasions when it difficult to distinguish between the actus reus and the mens rea,
for example, in theft where the thing initially comes into the thief ’s possession lawfully
but his/her decision to keep it turns the transaction into an offence.
Overall, then, it is not impossible for a child-defendant to plead insanity (or mental
disorder), absence of  mens rea or, where the charge is murder, diminished responsibility. It
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is, nonetheless, clear that each has shortcomings when applied to children such that the
case which they seek to make to exculpate from the crime charged might require to be
shoe-horned into an ill-fitting legal framework.
5 The form of the defence
It appears, then, that there are good reasons for seeking to protect young people within
the criminal process, that the conferment of  rights and responsibilities by reference to a
single, chronological age can be too arbitrary, that the MACR, whilst vital, may not be
sufficient fully to protect children and that other lack of  capacity defences are not entirely
appropriate for children. Some grounds for the provision of  a bespoke defence are thus
emerging. Before considering aspects of  the form this might take, however, the issue of
the public interest in conviction of  those who, often manifestly, carried out certainly the
actus reus of  serious crimes now needs to be taken into account.
The Law Commission ‘acknowledged that the recommendation [for a new defence for
the young in relation to diminished responsibility] was potentially controversial’,93
because some of  its consultees took the view that mitigating murder on the grounds of
developmental immaturity was ‘too generous to those who had killed with the fault
element for first degree murder’.94 It is clear that there is resistance in some spheres to
allowing criminal responsibility to be mitigated or removed on grounds of  incapacity. A
classic example is the case of  John Hinckley Jr who, in 1981, was found not guilty by
reason of  insanity in relation to the attempted assassination of  the then US president,
Ronald Reagan. There was considerable public opposition to the not guilty verdict to the
extent that a number of  states sought to abolish their laws on insanity.95
Lauran G Johansen commented that, the ‘public outcry was deafening’ such that
‘[m]ultiple jurisdictions rewrote statutory insanity defenses that had been carefully crafted
over years using the emerging bio-medical understanding of  mental illnesses’.96
Closer to home, the recommendations of  a recent report on the youth justice system
in England and Wales are tempered by an underlying anxiety about public opinion in
relation to children who commit serious crimes. It recommended that (in the immediate
term) the MACR should be raised to 12 ‘for all but the most grave offences (murder,
attempted murder, rape, manslaughter and aggravated sexual assault)’.97 Public opinion98
was one of  the main reasons for the ‘grave crimes’ exception despite the report’s
acknowledgment of  ‘the contradictions implicit in such a recommendation: that is, in
continuing to hold children who have committed the most heinous crimes responsible for
their behaviour one likely criminalises those most in need of  help’.99 Equally, the murder
of  Angela Wrightson in Hartlepool indicates that, on occasion, public opinion may also
have to be reined in. It has emerged that the original trial in 2015 was halted because the
nature of  the comment on social media was so extreme and abusive that it affected the
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chances of  a fair trial. The judge is reported to have referred to it as an ‘“avalanche of
prejudicial material” posted on [Facebook] by a “virtual lynch mob”’.100
The provision of  a defence would not exempt a young person over the MACR from
the trial process in the way that the MACR does. S/he would still be prosecuted. It would
thus resolve the immediate issue identified in relation to public opinion and grave crimes
– that raising the MACR would prevent any calling to account of  the young defendant.
The key point here is, however, more about the balancing required by the criminal process
between fairness to child-accuseds and the public interest in conviction of  those who
carry out seriously harmful acts. Unlike a MACR, a defence is not a blanket exemption
from criminal liability. No child defendant would have to plead it and, indeed, making the
plea is no guarantee of  success, which depends on the evidence. It would, nonetheless,
ensure that a person who was developmentally immature, and therefore lacked criminal
capacity, had a clear mechanism by which to bring this before the court. In principle, this
seems unobjectionable, provided that the defence itself  is cast in appropriate terms. This
will now be considered.
A defence is normally set up as a test. The question arising is: what is it that would
require to be established to acquit on the grounds of  developmental immaturity? For
around 1000 years, from Aethelstan’s law in the tenth century until s 34 of  the Crime and
Disorder Act 1998, English law operated a form of  a test in the shape of  the doli incapax
presumption. This required the prosecution to lead evidence in rebuttal that a child-
defendant knew that his/her act was seriously wrong as opposed to merely naughty.101
Latterly, it was applied to children aged between 10 and 14. While this provided a buffer
between children just over the MACR and the full rigours of  criminal responsibility, it in
no way reflected the complexity of  the issue of  criminal responsibility.102 Elliott criticises
it for focusing narrowly on ‘the moral awareness of  the child’,103 noting that:
. . . [m]oral awareness might be symptomatic of  children’s capacity in terms of
their intellectual development, but is only one aspect of  it. There will be other
consequences of  a child’s mental immaturity which the concept of  doli incapax
totally ignores.104
Indeed, the presumption had previously been criticised in the Court of  Appeal’s judgment
in C (A Minor) v DPP105 on the basis that ‘if  “seriously wrong” means neither “legally
wrong” nor “morally wrong,” what other yardstick remains?’106 Doli incapax, then,
captured only one facet of  the complex of  understandings required for the fair
imputation of  criminal responsibility. That facet – knowledge of  the difference between
right and wrong – is, nonetheless, clearly important in this context, but in both of  these
possible senses: the moral and the legal. In other words, understanding of  the general,
innate unacceptability of  the conduct (moral) and that it contravenes the law thereby
engendering particular consequences which do not apply to other types of  wrong-doing
(legal) are both required. The nature of  the child’s life experiences may be of  importance
in this respect.
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Equally fundamental is the requirement that the child’s development is such that s/he
has the ability to exercise rational control over action. This may incorporate consideration
of  a number of  issues. First, the central organising concepts discussed before – cognition
and the ego – need to be sufficiently developed so that the child is able to apply them to
determine rationally how to act and to bring action into line with these determinations.
Even if  Piaget’s view that intellectual development is complete by about the age of  15 is
accepted, this is still well above the existing MACRs. Indeed, it has been said that Piaget’s
conclusions ‘fail to account for the complete picture of  adolescent abilities, including the
changes that happen in the adolescent brain’.107 The evidence from neuro-science of
impaired impulse control – of  instinct, emotion and peer pressure being dominant, on
occasion over acceding to rational direction – should also be taken into account.
Exercising rational control also requires the ‘ability to use reasons in acting, thinking,
choosing, wanting, etc.’108 Thus, criminal capacity includes the ability to bring reason(s)
to bear in directing and constraining action. A young person who has developed this
ability could still say ‘I don’t know why I did it’ or ‘I did it for no reason’, but this would
not affect his/her criminal capacity.
An understanding of  causation is also required. An example can be found in an
examination of  facts following a successful plea in bar of  trial in Scotland on the (then)
ground of  insanity109 put forward on the basis of  the developmental delay suffered by a
13-year-old. The decision partly turned on his probable lack of  understanding of  the
effects of  setting light to a pool of  petrol. Its vapour ignited causing fatal injuries to
another child. The judge took the view, on the basis of  expert evidence from a senior fire
officer, a forensic witness and a consultant psychiatrist that, while the accused child would
have understood the flammability of  the physical pool of  petrol which he could see, he
would not have known about the (more) flammable qualities of  the invisible vapour.110
Part of  having criminal capacity is the ability to understand the consequences of  the
(allegedly) criminal act. This is dependent on an acceptable knowledge of  causation.
There is a fine line to be drawn between ignorance of  the law, which is not a defence
and the inability, through lack of  development, to understand the legal concepts on which
that law is based. The latter is also different from unfamiliarity with legal terminology.
The examination of  facts provides an example of  what is meant here with regard to the
concept of  recklessness.
In relation to a child, [the judge said that he] would agree [with defence counsel]
that if  a child of  a certain age would not have the capacity or experience to
foresee a certain danger then the standard of  conduct expected of  him may have
to be reduced . . . Certainly, children can act recklessly (and it may be that they
are even more prone to do so than adults) but their capacity to appreciate the
dangers they are creating may not always be sufficient to attach criminality to
their conduct.
It is the inability to appreciate the building blocks of  criminal offences, rather than the
lack of  understanding of  technical legal language, which is relevant to criminal capacity.
(Linguistic difficulties may, however, be relevant to a plea in bar of  trial.)
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Overall, then, what is sought is a test for a defence which can encompass all of  these
elements but which is not (necessarily) restricted to them. The wording below gives at
least a flavour of  how such a defence might be rendered in legislation. It is, in some
respects, almost a generic lack of  capacity defence but it is tied in to children by the
concept of  developmental immaturity. Its structure is drawn from the Scottish defence of
mental disorder.111
A child [or young person] is not criminally responsible for conduct which would otherwise
constitute an offence and should be acquitted if, due to developmental immaturity,
(a) s/he was unable sufficiently to know the full implications of, to understand, and/or to
appreciate the nature of, that conduct, its criminality, its wrongfulness and/or its
consequences (legal and/or physical); and/or
(b) s/he was severely restricted in his/her ability to judge whether to carry out the conduct,
to exercise rational control over the conduct and/or to refrain from carrying it out.
This is very comprehensive and could allow a child who is developmentally immature in
only one of  the areas covered potentially to be acquitted. The use of  ‘sufficiently’ and
‘severely restricted’ leave scope for a court to determine that the child’s developmental
immaturity was such that s/he lacked criminal responsibility even if  criminal capacity was
not completely absent. To make the defence more restricted, these could, of  course, be
replaced with more absolute terminology and it would be possible to cut down the list of
types of  circumstance in which the defence could be pled. In terms of  balancing the
child-defendant’s rights against the public interest, the proposed formulation would offer
considerable leeway to the child. Equally, it is constrained by the need for all or any of
these inabilities to stem directly from developmental immaturity and also by the upper age
limit which, in accordance with the UNCRC’s definition of  child, should be 18.112
Following a successful plea, it is proposed that the trial judge should have a power (but
not an obligation) to refer the child to the relevant family proceedings court (or, in
Scotland, to the children’s hearings system) for intervention on welfare grounds, if  this is
appropriate in all the circumstances. This could also apply, exceptionally, where it is clear
that the child-accused did not commit the offence but evidence emerges which would
warrant such a referral. In either case, it should be made clear that such a referral is not
on the grounds of  criminal behaviour.
6 Conclusion
The Prison Reform Trust reported in 2010113 that children in custody are among the
most vulnerable group in society. The Howard League reported earlier this year that
children who are looked after in children’s homes are being criminalised at excessively
high rates.114 A high number of  children with mental health problems are present in the
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 67(3)340
111  See Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s 51A.
112  In fact, the Royal College of  Psychiatrists’ evidence to the Law Commission indicated that it should remain
possible to consider developmental immaturity as relevant to diminished responsibility up to the age of  21.
Law Commission (2006) (n 10) para 5.129.
113  Jessica Jacobson, Bina Bhardwa, Tracey Gyateng, Gillian Hunter and Mike Hough, Punishing Disadvantage: A
Profile of  Children in Custody (Prison Reform Trust 2010).
114  Howard League, Criminal Care: Children’s Homes and Criminalising Children (Howard League 2016)
<http://howardleague.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Criminal-Care.pdf>.
youth justice system.115 The provision of  a bespoke defence for children aged between
the MACR and 18 charged with a crime may be a mechanism which keeps those young
people who lack criminal capacity because of  developmental immaturity from progressing
too far through the system. It has the benefit over an increase in the age of  criminal
responsibility of  differentiating between individuals in terms of  their actual
understanding so that child-defendants neither ‘get away with it’ nor, more importantly,
are criminalised where they lack capacity. It would allow information on issues of
maturity and capacity into the criminal process at the stage of  determining guilt where,
otherwise, these might only be heard in mitigation of  sentence. Because it could only be
pled in circumstances of  developmental immaturity it should not upset the balance
between the rights of  the accused and the public interest in conviction of  the guilty. For
all of  these reasons, it is commended as a humane and necessary step to protect the young
who do wrong.
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